The Effects of a Change in Market Abuse Regulation on Abnormal Returns and Volumes: Evidence from the Amsterdam Stock Market by Tyas Prevoo & Bas ter Weel
De Economist (2010) 158:237–293 © The Author(s) 2010
This article is published with open access at Springerlink.comDOI 10.1007/s10645-010-9146-1
DE ECONOMIST 158, NO. 3, 2010
THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION
ON ABNORMAL RETURNS AND VOLUMES: EVIDENCE FROM
THE AMSTERDAM STOCK MARKET
BY
TYAS PREVOO∗ AND BAS TER WEEL∗,∗∗
Summary
The Market Abuse Directive came into effect on 1 October 2005. One of its purposes is to reduce
illegal insider trading and leakage of information prior to official releases by increasing penalties.
Applying an event study approach to a dataset of almost 5,000 corporate news announcements,
the analysis reveals that the information value of announcements, measured by the announcement
day abnormal return and abnormal volume, is not significantly different after the new regulation
than it was before although the number of releases has increased significantly. Trading suspicious
of illegal insider trading and leakage of information, measured in terms of cumulative average
abnormal returns and volumes for the 30 days prior to the news announcement, has significantly
declined for small capitalization firms, for announcements containing information about alliances
and mergers and acquisitions and for firms in the technology sector.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As of 1 October 2005, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) is in effect. This
set of regulations concerns the publication of price sensitive information by
firms listed on the Amsterdam stock market. Firms are obliged to publicly
disclose information, which is considered to have an effect on the stock price
of its listing. The most prominent change of MAD is that penalties for insider
trading have been increased substantially. In addition, the supervision of the
publication of price sensitive information has been transferred from Euronext
Amsterdam to the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM).
The aim of this research is twofold. First, it investigates the effects of
MAD on the extent of stock market behaviour prior to corporate news
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announcements, which is suspicious of illegal insider trading. One purpose of
MAD is to increase market integrity and confidence. This can be achieved
by making the market “cleaner”. So, the first question is whether or not
MAD succeeded in decreasing the prevalence of illegal insider trading on
the Amsterdam stock market. Second, it investigates a change in the general
information level of announcements due to the change in regulation. In fear
of sanctions from a tough regulator for withholding information from the
market, firms may just publish as much information as possible, regardless of
whether the news is relevant. So, the second question is whether the informa-
tion content of corporate news announcements has changed after MAD.
The economic literature has little to say about the effectiveness of insider
trading regulation in the Netherlands. Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) exam-
ine the effects of regulation introduced in 1987 restricting insider trading in
Amsterdam and indicate that although trading by insiders did decrease in the
restricted period, overall liquidity decreased as well, which is not a desired
effect of the regulation.
We examine the research questions using a set of almost 5,000 corporate
news announcements, alongside stock prices and volumes. Using an event
study approach, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the cumu-
lative average abnormal returns and volumes prior to the date of news
announcements are lower after MAD. This indicates that illegal insider trad-
ing is less prevalent under the new directive, but still present. The second
question, that average abnormal returns and volumes on the announcement
day have changed under MAD, is rejected. Although the data show that
the number of announcements released by firms is larger after the new reg-
ulation, the average information content of these announcements has not
decreased. If anything, it seems to have increased slightly, although not signif-
icantly so. The results suggest that MAD has made markets cleaner, but not
at the expense of information overload. So, overall efficiency seems to have
increased in the Amsterdam stock market after the introduction of new leg-
islation.
Previous event studies often focus on large frequently traded firms, given
that data on these firms is more easily available. The impact of insider trad-
ing regulation might however depend on firm size too. Elliott et al. (1984)
note that smaller firms are not followed so closely by analysts, which might
give insiders more opportunities to reap benefits by trading on inside informa-
tion. For this reason, the analyses in this paper are also applied to sub-sam-
ples, which are divided by capitalization size. The Amsterdam stock exchange
contains three size classes. The results from these analyses show that small
capitalization firms drive much of the effects shown for the total sample.
MAD does not seem to have altered stock market behaviour surrounding
news announcements for larger firms. Dividing the market into different
THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION 239
industries suggests that especially the technology sector has become cleaner,
with no significant changes found for the other sectors.
The literature shows a large diversity in the way the impact of changes
in insider trading regulation is estimated. Different types of corporate news
announcements are used. Different types of news may have different charac-
teristics influencing market behaviour in different ways; the effects of regula-
tion may also differ along this dimension. This research uses data containing
various types of announcements, allowing to distinguish the effects of MAD
by announcement type. The effects are shown to be strongest for announce-
ments containing news on alliances, takeovers and mergers and acquisitions.
The apparent leakage of information prior to the announcement date in terms
of pre-announcement run-up in prices and volumes has significantly decreased
after MAD is in effect.
Finally, previous work on stock market behaviour surrounding news
announcements often uses absolute returns to explain and find patterns of
illegal insider trading, whereas making a distinction between bad news and
good news allows for a comparison between the magnitude of the price reac-
tion to bad news announcements and that of good news announcements. The
results show that the market has become cleaner especially in the bad news
segment, which suggests that bad news messages have been published sooner
after MAD is in effect.
This paper is set up as follows. The next section describes the changes
in market abuse regulation in the Netherlands. The approach of estimat-
ing the effects on stock market behaviour is explained in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data and gives a number of descriptive statistics. Section 5
reports the main results of the analysis. Section 6 shows the robustness of the
estimates and Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
The Act on the Supervision of the Securities Trade 1995 (WTE) is the prin-
cipal act governing the supervision carried out by the Netherlands Author-
ity for the Financial Markets (AFM). The WTE provides that the AFM can
exercise supervision by means of statutory powers to carry out investigations
and inspections, monitor compliance and obtain information that are laid
down in the act. As of 1 October 2005, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) is
incorporated in the Netherlands into the WTE (Articles 45-47) and the Mar-
ket Abuse Decree. The aim is to sharpen, expand, and harmonize the exist-
ing European regime and to achieve improved protection for market integrity
within Europe.
The results of the implementation of MAD are an expansion of the prohi-
bition against market manipulation and the transfer of the supervision of the
publication of price-sensitive information by listed companies from
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Euronext Amsterdam (previously dictated by rule 28h of the Fondsenregle-
ment) to the AFM. Additionally, a transparency regime for publicists of
investment recommendations and a requirement for securities institutions to
report a reasonable suspicion of trading with insider information or mar-
ket manipulation (the so-called klikplicht) have been introduced. Finally, the
existing provisions regarding trading with insider information, the report-
ing requirement for “insiders” and the insider regulations are adapted with
respect to the prior legislation.
The rulemaking contains the requirement for issuing companies whose
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the Netherlands,
to immediately (i.e., without delay) publish price-sensitive information. The
publication of price-sensitive information should occur through the publica-
tion of a press release. It is the responsibility of the issuing company to
determine the best practice for an immediate and simultaneous (accessible to
all) publication of its price-sensitive information. Price-sensitive information
should be made public in such a way that it is immediately available for every-
one such that it is possible for investors to assess whether the information
is complete, correct, and timely. The AFM is the authority for the supervi-
sion of the publication of price-sensitive information and will receive the press
releases at the time of publication. The AFM does not review or approve
the press releases before publication. The AFM does retrospectively evaluate
whether investors have been accurately, timely, and completely informed.
Trading in securities using insider information damages the confidence in
the proper working of the securities markets because the one who trades upon
the basis of such information has an unjustified advantage over other inves-
tors. To guarantee the confidence of investors it is important to provide ade-
quate regulation to prevent the use of insider information. Trading with the
use of insider information is a serious offence and is prohibited for every-
one. To this end, the AFM closely follows conduct and transactions in finan-
cial markets. If trading is determined to be in violation of the prohibition, a
criminal or administrative sanction will follow. The prohibition is set down in
Article 46(1) and (3) of the WTE. The prohibition is directed at everyone but
recognizes a distinction between so-called “primary insiders” such as directors
and member of the supervisory board of directors of an issuing institution
and “secondary insiders” (everyone else).
Market manipulation is forbidden by Article 46b, paragraph 1 and con-
sists of four sections. It is forbidden to (1) execute or bring about a trans-
action or place and order in securities by which an incorrect or misleading
signal is relayed regarding the offer or bid price of the securities; (2) exe-
cute or bring about a transaction or place and order in securities in order to
maintain the price of the securities at an artificial level; (3) execute or bring
about a transaction or place and order in securities in which deception or
misleading is made use of; and (4) spread information from which an incor-
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rect or misleading signal is relayed regarding the offer or bid price of the
securities while the spreader knows or reasonably should know that the infor-
mation is incorrect or misleading.
The scope of the prohibition against market manipulation is very broad.
Manipulation is forbidden in or from the Netherlands. It is also forbidden to
manipulate the market outside of Europe in securities, which are admitted to
trading on a regulated market located or functioning in the Netherlands. It
does not matter whether the transaction occurs via the system of a regulated
market or outside of it.
The legislation includes the requirement for securities institutions to imme-
diately report trading, which is reasonably suspicious of insider trading or
market abuse to the AFM. This provision has a preventive character: if peo-
ple are aware that “suspicious” transactions will be notified by those with the
reporting obligation then this will have the potential effect of deterring people
from performing such transactions. Additionally, such notifications support
the supervisor in its supervision of market manipulation, which in turn con-
tributes to the confidence of investors in the financial markets. The reporting
duty applies only to securities institutions as defined in the WTE who have a
reasonable suspicion that a transaction or an order, for which it in or from
the Netherlands transacts, is in violation of the prohibition against insider
trading or market manipulation. The securities institution does not have to
prove that there actually was insider trading or market manipulation in order
to make a notification. The reporting duty concerns license holders as well as
those who are exempted from the licensing requirement. The reporting duty
rests upon the institution itself. Within the institution, the reporting duty is
directed at individuals who perform securities transactions as part of their
employment.
3 APPROACH
We focus on changes in the information content of press releases by quoted
companies before and after MAD. MAD could have led to a change in behav-
iour concerning the treatment of information by companies quoted on the
stock exchange. Such possible changes allow us to investigate whether the
information content of publications of price-sensitive information has changed
since 1 October 2005. MAD is assumed to be an exogenous event with no
changing behaviour prior to the switch. We need this assumption to carry out
a statistical analysis in which MAD serves as a watershed. In the process of
implementation markets were informed of its contents by consultation meet-
ings with the regulator. This process took place during the spring and sum-
mer of 2005. An important aspect of our assumption is that we do not want
anticipation effects to blur the analysis. It could be the case that firms already
changed their behaviour prior to the implementation. Below, in Figure 1, we











































Figure 1 – Difference in weekly announcements before and after the market abuse directive
document that the number of press releases went up after the introduction of
MAD but that this effect seems to fade away after about six months. Looking
at the raw data we only observe a rise in the number of press releases after
implementation and not an increase before MAD became effective.
Press releases contain information. This information is released because of
the possibility that not all market parties have available valuable facts about
issuing companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated
market in the Netherlands. In a clean market abnormal trading returns or
volumes should not precede unexpected press releases. Other press releases,
such as the upcoming publication of annual returns, might be subject to spec-
ulation in the market and show a pattern of abnormal returns in the period
before its release, even in a clean market.
3.1 Market model
There are a number of approaches that can be applied to calculate returns:
statistical and economic models. The statistical models are most widely used
in the current event study literature, and they follow from statistical assump-
tions about the behaviour of stock market returns with hardly any depen-
dence on economic arguments. The potential advantage from applying eco-
nomic models is to be able to calculate the normal returns more precisely by
adding economic restrictions.
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Two statistical models are the constant mean return model and the factor
model (e.g., MacKinlay 1997). Using daily stock prices, the constant mean
return model defines the expected return of a security to be the average of the
daily returns over the estimation window. Factor models are applied to reduce
the variance of the abnormal return by explaining more of the variance in the
normal return. A commonly used factor model is the market model, which
relates the return of a security to the return of its relevant market portfolio.
The daily returns Ri,t of an individual security i on day t are calculated as
Ri,t = Pi,t − Pi,t−1Pi,t−1 , (1)
where Pi,t is the closing price for security i on day t .
The market model is represented by
Ri,t =αi +βi RM,t + εi,t , (2)
where Ri,t and RM,t are the period-t returns of security i and the market
portfolio M;αi and βi are the market model parameters and εi,t is the error
term which has an expected value of zero. The market model is a one-fac-
tor model, whereas other factor models may use multiple factors to further
reduce variation in the normal returns. One such example is the use of indus-
try indexes in addition to the market index.
To improve the fit of the normal return equation, we use the return of
the relevant capitalization index as the relevant market portfolio, rather than
the index for the entire Amsterdam stock exchange. This means our market
model for normal returns is represented by
Ri,t =αi +βi RC,t + εi,t , (3)
where Ri,t is the return on security i for at time t and RC,t is the return on
the relevant capitalization index C at time t . The expected normal return is
estimated over a given estimation window for each announcement separately,
meaning that α and β are estimated for each news announcement. Announce-
ments are considered firm specific, so each announcement is associated with
the returns of the security that released it. The estimated abnormal return is
then:
AR j,t = R j,t − (αˆ j + βˆ j RC,t ), (4)
where AR j,t is the abnormal return for announcement j at time t , where the
returns are those of the security releasing announcement j . Thus, αˆ j and βˆ j
are the estimates of the market model parameters for announcement j . Time
t is here relative to the date of the news announcement, with t =0 being the
announcement day.
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To derive conclusions about the effects of certain events, the abnormal
returns must be aggregated. This aggregation has to occur along two dimen-
sions. Firstly, across time to compute cumulative abnormal returns to make
a judgement about possible insider trading within a given time period and
secondly, across securities to make a judgment about a change in investor
behaviour in the market as a whole. For each announcement the cumula-
tive abnormal return (CAR) is then calculated by summing up the abnormal
returns for the period of interest:
C AR j (a,b)=
b∑
t=a
AR j,t . (5)
To investigate the effect of the change in market abuse regulation market
wide, the CARs of the separate announcements are then averaged to get the





C AR j (a,b), (6)
where a and b are the start and the end of the period over which the pre-
announcement stock market behaviour is to be evaluated.
Once this aggregation has taken place, a single measure for the cumula-
tive average abnormal return (CAAR) over the period of interest remains, for
which the significance can be tested using the t-statistic
tC AAR = C AAR(a,b)
var(C AAR(a,b))
1/2
∼ N (0,1), (7)
where a and b are the start and the end of the period over which the pre-
announcement stock market behaviour has to be evaluated.
The reaction of volumes around the release of a news announcement is
estimated along similar lines. Wong (2002) and Monteiro et al. (2007) exten-
sively describe how normal volumes and thus abnormal volumes have to be
calculated. The main differences are adjustments for first order serial cor-
relation and day-of-the-week effects, after which volume can be assumed to
be approximately normally distributed, which allows for the same signifi-
cance test as is applied to the abnormal returns. Day-of-the-week dummies
are incorporated in the model due to the anomaly documented in the liter-
ature that stock market volume is dependent on the day of the week (e.g.,
Berument et al. 2004; Berument and Kiymaz 2001; Kiymaz and Berument
2003). So, first the natural logarithm is taken of the volume traded on day t ,
and regressors are included to control for weekdays. Expected volume is then
estimated for each announcement, which gives the abnormal volume (AV).
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The cumulative abnormal volume is then calculated for each announcement
by summing up average volumes for the period of interest. This leads to sim-
ilar equations as documented for returns.
The increase in the cumulative average abnormal return and cumulative
average abnormal volumes prior to the announcement date are common
instruments to measure the extent of information leakage and illegal insider
trading. This leads to the first hypothesis, which will be tested in this paper:
Hypothesis 1 The absolute cumulative average abnormal return/volume prior to
corporate news announcements is smaller after the implementation of MAD.
MAD may also lead firms to release information to the public, which they
would not release without it. This is a desired result if this information is
price relevant, which decreases the information asymmetry in the market and
gives investors more equal opportunities on the stock market. Tighter rules
and regulations might on the other hand be termed as ‘regulatory overkill’
(e.g., Kabir and Vermaelen 1996). The new regulation might lead firms to
publish all information, including information, which is not price relevant. In
this case, investors might be overloaded with information, making the mar-
ket less efficient. If firms indeed publish less informative announcements, the
average price and volume reaction after the announcement date will be lower.
This leads to the second hypothesis that will be investigated in this paper:
Hypothesis 2 The absolute average abnormal return/volume after corporate news
announcements is smaller after the implementation of MAD.
3.2 Estimation and event window
For the model to have predictive power, α and β have to be estimated using
a sufficiently large number of days. There is a payoff between adding pre-
dictive power and losing data. The larger the estimation window, the more
news announcements will not be able to be used because not enough data
for the securities is available. On the other hand, if the estimation window
is too small, there is not much predictive power in the model. The choice of
the length of the estimation window used in the event study literature cov-
ers a range of approaches. Observed lengths are 240 trading days (Brown
and Warner 1985; Monteiro et al. 2007), 150 trading days (Meulbroek 1992;
Sanders and Zdanowicz 1992), and 100 trading days (Kabir and Vermaelen
1996; Keown and Pinkerton 1981). We use an estimation window of 120 trad-
ing days. This length of the estimation window is also used by Wong (2002)
and proposed by MacKinlay (1997).
A second issue is the timing of the estimation window. This timing depends
on the decision as to what confines the event window. Sanders and Zdanowicz
(1992) note that pre-announcement average abnormal returns are measured
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over time periods varying from 10 to 60 days. Which period is considered
to be likely to be influenced by information leakage and illegal insider trad-
ing influences the period that should be used to estimate the market model
parameters. Similar to Keown and Pinkerton (1981) – who base their choice
to exclude the 25 trading days preceding the news announcement on results of
Halpern (1973) – the impact of the market reaction to the announcement on
the market model parameters is taken into account by excluding the 30 trad-
ing days prior to the press release. Thus, the analyses are based on a model
for which the parameters have been estimated using an estimation window of
120 trading days, from t =−150 to and including t =−30, where t =0 is the
day of the news announcement.
After establishing the extent to which prices and volumes react abnormally
relative to the market around the publication of a news announcement, it is
important to determine the timing of this reaction and whether the change in
regulation as of 1 October 2005 alters this timing. As Keown and Pinkerton
(1981) point out, Halpern (1973) finds that 58% of the price movement occurs
one month prior to the announcement date. We evaluate the absolute CAAR
and the CAAV over the period t =−30 to t =−1, where t = 0 is the day of
the announcement. In sum, (ab)normal returns are estimated using an estima-
tion window of 120 trading days, starting 30 trading days prior to the release
of the announcement. The 30 days preceding the announcement are then our
event window, over which we investigate the abnormal price movements.1
3.3 Bad news and good news
A contribution of this paper to the existing literature is to provide insights in
the difference in price and volume reaction between bad news announcements
and good news announcements.
The difficulty here lies in the decision how to make the distinction between
these two categories. Wong (2002) distinguishes bad news from good news by
the sign of the return after a news announcement. There are two problems
with this definition: illegal insider trading and market anticipation. If illegal
insider trading is a relevant problem, the information within the announce-
ment is already – at least partially – digested by the market prior to its offi-
cial release. This takes place because insiders in possession of this informa-
tion use their knowledge and trade on it prior to it being released to the
market. The market also recognizes this informed trading and follows these
1 Halpern (1973) finds that as much as half of the price movement occurs two months prior
to the announcement date. Although the period prior to 30 days before the announcement date
is included in the regression analysis as part of estimation window, a second measure is the
absolute CAAR and the CAAV for the 60-day pre-announcement period from t =−60 to t =
−1. The results using this 60-day pre-announcement period are generally similar to those look-
ing at the 30-day pre-announcement period, and are available from the authors upon request.
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movements (Meulbroek 1992). In addition to recognition of informed trad-
ing, the market may anticipate certain announcements. For these reasons,
the price change after an announcement might lead to misspecification of
an announcement in terms of it being bad or good news. Therefore the dis-
tinction between bad and good news announcements is made by looking at
the price change around the date of the announcement. An announcement is
defined as good news if the cumulative abnormal return of the period t =−5
up to and including t = 4 is larger or equal to zero. In the case this CAR is
negative, the announcement is considered bad news. Using Wong’s (2002) def-
inition of good and bad news does not alter the main conclusions; the results
of using this approach are available upon request.
4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This section introduces the data we use for the empirical analysis and presents
the most salient statistics. In Appendix I and II more detailed information
about the data can be found.
4.1 Data
This paper applies an event study approach to the effects of the change in
market abuse regulation on 1 October 2005. Thus this date – the event date –
forms the midpoint of the period to be investigated. New regulation regard-
ing market abuse and market manipulation most recently became effective on
1 January 2007. To prevent the results of the analyses in this paper to be
affected by this new set of rules and regulations, the post-event period ends
on 31 December 2006. To make the pre-event period comparable to the post-
event period, the same length of time is used for both periods, meaning this
study is based on data from 15 months prior to the change in legislation and
15 months after the change.
Corporate news announcements for the period from 1 July 2004 to 31
December 2006 for listings on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are collected
from the publicly accessible online corporate news database of NYSE
Euronext. Given that this paper also wishes to evaluate the changes in mar-
ket behaviour by firm size, announcements are collected by NYSE Euronext’s
compartment division: compartment A (Large Caps, 5,398 announcements),
compartment B (Mid Caps, 2,736 announcements), and compartment C
(Small Caps, 2,171 announcements). All announcements published after 5pm
are considered as announcements published on the next trading day.
Daily closing prices and trading volumes for the securities releasing news
announcements are collected using Thomson One. The daily closing prices
for the cap and industry indices used to obtain the abnormal returns are
also obtained from Thomson One. All non-trading days are removed from
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the data. Then, for every security, all days for which no return can be calcu-
lated are removed. The next step is to remove those announcements for which
too little data is available. For the abnormal returns analysis daily returns are
needed for the period from 150 days prior to the announcement to 30 days
prior to the announcement. All announcements for which there are less than
120 observed returns in this period are eliminated from the dataset. After this
selection process 5,168 announcements remain, of which 2,747 by large cap-
italization firms, 1,749 by mid cap firms, and 672 by small cap firms. Since
extreme values and outliers may heavily influence the results of the analysis,
the dataset is further cleaned. All announcements by the IT service group Ge-
tronics are removed, since the results for Getronics are heavily influenced by a
stock split in May 2005. As a last step, all announcements with an abnormal
return in the period t =−60 to t =5 larger than or equal to 20% are removed
from the dataset, resulting in the final dataset of 4,979 announcements.
The problem with estimating abnormal volumes is that for the indices vol-
umes are not recorded. Therefore, volume indices have to be constructed.
Since the analysis uses cap size as a group-defining characteristic, three
volume indices are created: large cap volume, mid cap volume, and small cap
volume. The approach here is to simply add the daily volumes of large cap
securities for each calendar date, resulting in a measure for daily market vol-
ume for large caps. The same process is used to create a mid cap and a
small cap market volume measure. In doing so, only the securities remaining
in the final dataset are considered. Furthermore, since firms do not remain
unchanged in terms of cap size, the decision needs to be made in which mar-
ket volume index a security should be included. The criterion used here is to
include the daily volume of a security in the index if the share of the total
amount of announcements published by a firm between 1 July 2004 and 31
December 2006 within the relevant cap size is larger than 95%.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
The final dataset contains 4,979 announcements released by 124 securities
over the period from 1 July 2004 to 31 December 2006. Table 1 shows the
composition of this dataset by cap size (large, mid and small) and period
(before or after MAD). A Pearson’s chi-square test for independence, with a
p-value smaller than 0.01, does not allow the hypothesis of no relationship to
be rejected. This indicates that there is a relationship between the period and
the number of corporate news announcements released by the different cap-
italization groups. Where prior to MAD the large caps account for 51% of
all announcements, this percentage is 57% afterwards. Besides the change in
the distribution of total announcements by cap size, it is also clear that after
MAD came into effect a larger number of announcements have been pub-
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TABLE 1 – ANNOUNCEMENTS BY CAPITALIZATION AND SUPERVISOR
Capitalization Market Abuse Directive Total
Before After
Large 1,078 1,633 2,711
Mid 769 881 1,650
Small 257 361 618
Total 2,104 2,875 4,979
lished period (2,875 vs. 2,104). This also holds for the three cap size groups
separately.
A similar observation has already been documented by the AFM (2007) in
a report that looks at the period of one year after the regulatory change. In
a comparison of the number of announcements per month, the report shows
that in the first months following the introduction of MAD the number of
press releases is larger than in the same month the year before.
Figure 1 depicts a similar trend looking at announcements published per
calendar week. The first of October 2005 is a Saturday, with Monday 3 Octo-
ber 2005 being the start of week 41 of the year 2005, which is the first week
the MAD was in effect. The number of announcements in this week is com-
pared to the number of announcements in week 41 of 2004. Such a com-
parison is made for all weeks up to comparing week 40 of 2006 to week 40
of 2005. To smooth out the volatility in weekly announcements, the num-
bers have been averaged over three weeks. Figure 1 depicts the difference in
the three-week moving averages of the post- and pre-MAD period. Figure 1
shows that the number of announcements published in each week are higher
after MAD comes into effect. This difference is largest in the first weeks and
months after the introduction of MAD. The difference only drops below zero
after week 17, which is the average number of announcements for the weeks
15, 16, and 17 of 2006 minus the average number of announcements for the
weeks 15, 16, and 17 of 2005. Similar to the conclusions in the report by
the AFM (2007), firms publish more announcements up to half a year after
MAD becomes effective.
To investigate whether the increase in total number of announcements can
be said to be a result of the change in the market abuse regulation, a similar
overview to Table 1 – at the level of single securities – is given in Table 12 in
Appendix I. Performing a paired sample t-test on those securities that have a
positive number of announcements in both supervisor periods yields an unta-
bulated mean increase of 3.05 in the number of announcements posted by a
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TABLE 2 – ANNOUNCEMENTS BY ANNOUNCEMENT TYPE AND SUPERVISOR
Announcement type Market Abuse Directive Total
Before After
Alliances/M&A 227 574 801
Sales 97 99 196
Share introduction and issues 17 483 500
Commercial operation 125 108 233
Income 740 777 1,517
Corporate life 21 161 182
Board/general meeting 117 78 195
Meetings/events 21 26 47
Other 739 569 1,308
Total 2,104 2,875 4,979
single security during the 15 months after MAD, compared to the 15 months
prior to MAD. This difference is significant at the 5% level. If the amount of
news related to a firm that influences stock prices is assumed to be constant
over time, at least over the total sample of securities, this difference supports
the suspicion that firms release more announcements probably in fear of sanc-
tions after MAD, regardless of the news announcements containing relevant
information or not. Table 13 in Appendix I documents which companies are
included in which index.
In the literature on insider trading and insider trading laws, different types
of corporate announcements are used to investigate the extent of illegal insider
trading. Announcements in the database of company news are divided into
a number of topics. Most announcements are classified by several topics. All
combinations of topics are subdivided into nine different announcement cat-
egories. Table 2 denotes the number of announcements within each category,
in total and before and after MAD. Performing Pearson’s chi-square test of
independence indicates that the share of total announcements of a certain
announcement type is not independent of the change in regulation. The null
hypothesis of no association between announcement type and regulation is
rejected at the 1% level. Table 14 in Appendix II shows a detailed overview
of the categorisation of news types.
With the dependence between periods and cap size on the one hand and
between period and announcement type on the other hand, it is appropriate
to divide the dataset along these dimensions and to perform the analyses sep-
arately for the three cap sizes and the different announcement types. As noted
above, another dimension that might influence the results of the analyses is
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TABLE 3 – ANNOUNCEMENTS BY WEEKDAY AND SUPERVISOR
Weekday Market Abuse Directive Total
Before After
Monday 348 505 853
Tuesday 396 544 940
Wednesday 451 641 1,092
Thursday 471 620 1,091
Friday 438 565 1,003
Total 2,104 2,875 4,979
the day of the week an announcement is published. Table 3 reports the num-
ber of announcements by weekday and by period. The value of a Pearson’s
chi-square test is 2.35, which is associated with a probability of 0.67. Thus
the hypothesis of independence between supervisor and number of announce-
ments by weekday cannot be rejected and it is therefore not necessary to take
account of the weekday an announcement is released on, when evaluating the
effects of MAD.
5 RESULTS
This section presents the results of the effectiveness of MAD. It first shows
an analysis of abnormal returns and volumes. Thereafter results by type of
announcement and industry are shown.
5.1 Abnormal returns
The development of abnormal returns is plotted in Figure 2. Plot A shows
that the trend in the CAAR for good news announcements is similar under
both regimes, whereas the CAAR for bad news announcements before MAD
falls below that of the post-implementation period as early as 12 days prior to
the announcement. Looking at firm size, Plot B for the large caps shows con-
tradicting trends. For good news announcements it seems that the CAAR for
AFM is higher than that for Euronext, yet the absolute CAAR for bad news
announcements is smaller for AFM than for Euronext. The opposite picture
is shown in Plot C for the mid caps. The difference in the development of
the CAAR prior to the announcement date is in line with a cleaner market
after MAD for good news announcements, yet contradicting it for bad news
announcements.
The most pronounced differences between the two regimes in terms of
pre-announcement CAAR trends are visible in Plot D for announcements by
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Figure 2 – Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns
small firms. There is no difference between the two regimes looking at the
plots for good news announcements, with both CAARs fluctuating around
zero until 5 days prior to the announcement date. However, the absolute aver-
age abnormal returns for bad news announcements are much larger under
Euronext than under AFM. The CAAR for AFM remains around zero until
t =−5, whereas the plot for Euronext drops below that for AFM as early as
28 days prior to the press release, with the difference increasing.
Table 4 gives the statistics related to Figure 2 and reports the cumulative
average abnormal returns (CAARs) for various sub-samples of the data for
several periods around the publication of the announcement. “30-day run-
up” is the CAAR for the 30-day period preceding the announcement (from
t =−30 to t =−1). Similarly, “5-day run-up” is the CAAR for the 5-day pre-
announcement period from t =−5 to t =−1. “day 0 aar” is the average abnor-
mal return on the day of the announcement (t =0). Finally, “5-day post caar”
is the CAAR for the 5 days after the announcement (t = 0 to t = 4). The
means and differences are given for the entire sample (Total) as well as for the
announcements categorized by firm size (Large caps, Mid caps, Small caps).
Panel A contains the results for announcements considered to be bad news,
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whereas Panel B contains the results for good news announcements. The stan-
dard errors are reported under SE.
Looking at the total sample, for both good and bad news announcements,
the run-up CAAR is significant for both pre-announcement periods (5-day
and 30-day run-up), both before and after MAD. For good news announce-
ments, the difference between the CAARs of the two regimes is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. However, for bad news announcements the abso-
lute CAAR is significantly larger before MAD for the 30-day run-up. This
indicates that MAD has led to a more efficient market.
Looking at firm size, the results for large capitalization firms are ambig-
uous. For bad news announcements the absolute pre-announcement CAAR
is larger before MAD, whereas for good news announcements, the 30-day
run-up is significantly larger after MAD, which in turn would indicate a less
efficient market. For mid caps, the differences are insignificant for bad news
announcements, whereas they are significant (and have the expected sign) for
good news announcements. The results for small capitalization firms (Small
caps) are in line with those for the entire sample. There is no significant
difference between the CAAR of both regimes for good news
announcements, yet for bad news announcements, the absolute pre-announce-
ment CAAR before MAD is significantly larger than afterwards. Compar-
ing the statistically insignificant mean 30-day run-up CAR of −0.67% after
MAD with the highly significant −5.93% before MAD, the hypothesis that
the CAAR is smaller after MAD cannot be rejected (with the difference of
−5.26% being significant at the 1% level).
In sum, for large caps and mid caps there is no clear-cut change in the
pre-announcement CAAR after MAD. Nevertheless, MAD has had an effect
on the abnormal returns prior to press releases of the small caps. The pre-
announcement run-up for bad news announcements has decreased and is no
longer significantly different from zero, suggesting a change in market behav-
iour, and providing support for Hypothesis 1.
Looking at the effect of the change in the market abuse regulation on the
news value of announcements, the average abnormal return on the announce-
ment day can be used as a proxy for the information content of the announce-
ment. The results in Table 4 show that differences in the day zero average
abnormal returns are insignificant. If anything, the results seems to provide
support for a hypothesis that announcements are more informative after
MAD, since seven out of eight differences in the absolute announcement day
AAR are negative. Hypothesis 2 is thus rejected.
5.2 Abnormal volumes
Even though price reactions provide important insights in the effects of the
release of new information around the date of the announcement, trading on
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Figure 3 – Plots of cumulative average abnormal volumes
share relevant information might not be seen in price changes if the informa-
tion is not public. If an individual possesses information which leads him/her
to believe a certain stock price is going to rise in the near future, and if the
information is not known to or anticipated by the market as a whole, the
transaction will not necessarily lead to an increase in the price of the stock.
Insider trading might then only be discovered when examining trade volumes.
Figure 3 and Table 5 show the results of the abnormal volumes analy-
sis. The plots of the CAAVs in Figure 3 show developments similar to those
observed in Figure 2 for the CAARs. All announcements taken together, there
is a clear jump in the CAAV on the day of the announcement, which indicates
that the announcements have real news value. For the total sample (Panel
A), for bad news, the run-up in the CAAV is rather small when compared
to the run-up in the CAAV for good news announcements, which is in line
with Wong’s (2002) hypothesis that good news disseminates faster than bad
news. Panel D for the small caps sample shows that the CAAV for bad news
announcements moves around zero until the announcement day, when a clear
upward jump is visible. For good news announcements before MAD, the
same trend as for the total sample is observed: a steadily increasing CAAV
prior to the news announcement.
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Where there seems to be no clear change in the reaction of the stock mar-
ket in terms of volume after MAD for the total sample and the mid cap sam-
ple, the effects for the large cap sample are not as expected. For good news
announcements before MAD, a large drop in the CAAV is visible, whereas
under AFM supervision the CAAV shows a strong increase long before the
announcement day. This would indicate that in terms of volumes, the market
for large caps has become less clean after MAD.
When turning to the results for the mid caps, a strong increase in vol-
umes is visible prior to the release of the news announcement. The trend in
the CAAVs for mid caps have not changed after the MAD came into effect,
yet the large run-up prior to the announcement date for good news in the
small caps sample has disappeared after MAD. This result strengthens the
results from the abnormal returns analysis and provides additional support
for smaller abnormal volumes after 1 October 2005.
The conclusions drawn from the plots in Figure 3 are confirmed by the sta-
tistics in Table 5. For bad news, the run-up in the 30-day pre-announcement
period is significant at the 5% level only for the mid caps sample, with the dif-
ference between the two regimes being insignificant. For good news, the 30-
day run-up is positive and significant for all samples except for the small caps
sample after MAD, where the CAAV is not significantly different from zero.
The AAVs on the announcement day are all positive and significant at the 1%
level, whereas there are no significant changes in these day-zero AAVs after
the transfer of supervision on 1 October 2005.
Although the results presented in Table 5 are in line with those of the
abnormal returns analysis presented in Table 4, the volume index measures
used in calculating the abnormal volumes around corporate news announce-
ments may have influenced them. Since the measure for the market volume is
self-constructed using the securities in the dataset, the results may be sensitive
to changes in this measure.
These results for the abnormal volumes analysis confirm those from the
abnormal returns analysis. The effect of MAD is most pronounced for small
cap firms. There are strong indications that for those firms, the increase in the
CAAR and CAAV prior to the public release of an announcement has disap-
peared. In the case of small firms, there is strong support for Hypothesis 1,
suggesting a cleaner and more efficient market. The results of both the abnor-
mal returns and abnormal volumes analyses provide no support for Hypoth-
esis 2, leading to the conclusion that there are no significant changes in the
information content of news announcements.
5.3 Type of announcement
There are numerous studies on the prevalence of illegal insider trading. The
analyses are based on stock market behaviour surrounding news announce-
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Figure 4 – Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns: by announcement type
ments released by firms. The type of news announcement used to analyse the
extent of illegal insider trading differs across studies. To investigate the differ-
ent effects for different types of announcements, Figure 4 and Table 6 report
the results for Alliances/M&A announcements, Sales announcements, Com-
mercial Operation announcements and Income announcements.
Panels B, C and D of Figure 4 show no apparent effects of the change
in market abuse regulation for sales announcements, commercial operation
announcements or income announcements. The CAARs before and after MAD
follow the same trends. So for these announcement types, there is no indi-
cation that MAD altered the market’s behaviour. The picture for announce-
ments concerning alliances and mergers and acquisitions (Panel A) leads to a
different conclusion.
For Alliances/M&A announcements the plots in Panel A of Figure 4 show
that the price reaction to good news before MAD is apparent long before
the official announcement at day t =0. This run-up suggests leakage of infor-
mation and illegal insider trading and is consistent with the literature docu-
menting stock market behaviour surrounding M&A announcements (see e.g.,
Keown and Pinkerton 1981; Meulbroek 1992). This run-up is no longer visible























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION 263
after MAD, which means the results for Alliances/M&A Announcements lend
support for Hypothesis 1, consistent with a cleaner market after MAD.
The results shown in Table 6 confirm these observations, with the 30-day
run-up for bad news Alliances/M&A announcements being insignificant after
MAD, whereas it is positive and significant before. Having a closer look at
the AARs on the day of the announcement, the day zero absolute average
abnormal returns are significantly larger after MAD for income announce-
ments and for sales announcements containing good news, meaning these
events contain more information than similar announcements did before. When
taking into account the type of announcement, Hypothesis 2 is again rejected.
5.4 Results by industry
Figure 5 and Table 7 report the results of the abnormal returns analysis for
different industries. The plots in Figure 5 show that for Consumer Goods,
Consumer Services and Financials, MAD has not changed the stock market
behaviour around the publication of an announcement. For Industrials (Panel
A) it seems that for bad news announcements, the price reaction prior to an
announcement has become larger after the change in market abuse regula-
tion. For Technology (Panel E), the pre-announcement run-up before MAD
for bad news announcements is stronger than after MAD.
Looking at the significance of these observations in Table 7, the results
for the total sample (Table 4) are only matched by those for the technology
industry. For bad news announcements released by firms with the Industrial
Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification Technology, the absolute aver-
age abnormal returns prior to day zero are significantly larger before MAD
than they are in the period after, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. This indicates
that for the technology industry, the problem of leakage of information prior
to an official press release has significantly decreased since MAD. For the
other industries the difference in the 30-day run-up CAAR before and after
MAD is not statistically significant.
Looking at the announcement day AARs, news announcements do not
seem to contain less information after the shift in regulation. All day-zero
AARs are significant and have the expected signs, with the difference between
the two regimes being not significantly different from zero. In sum, when the
analysis is performed at the industry level, Hypothesis 2 is rejected, while
there is strong support in favour of Hypothesis 1.
Looking at the results on the industry level might lead to the conclusion
that the change in regulation has had large effects in the technology industry.
This is in line with Ahmed and Schneible (2007), who find that small firms
and high tech firms drive the effect of US Regulation Fair Disclosure. The
numbers presented in Table 8 indicate that the results for Technology are not
necessarily driven by a behavioural change within the Technology industry.
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Figure 5 – Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns: by industry
The share of total announcements released by the technology industry that
come from small capitalization firms is 44.5%.
Looking at the results from the analysis for small cap firms (e.g., Table 4),
the results for Technology can be said to be strongly affected by the under-
lying behavioural change observed for small capitalization firms. Table 8 then
also gives and indication to why no effects are found for the other industries.
The shares of announcements made by small capitalization firms within the
other industries are very small, ranging from 2.8% for Consumer Services to
11.5% for Financials.
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TABLE 8 – NUMBER OF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY INDUSTRY AND CAPITALIZATION
Industry Capitalization Total
Large Mid Small
Industrials 393 568 73 1,034
Consumer goods 423 95 56 574
Consumer services 395 240 18 653
Financials 635 323 124 1,082
Technology 145 175 257 577
Total 2,711 1,650 618 4,979
6 ROBUSTNESS
The results presented in the previous section might be sensitive to changes
in the sample to which the analysis is applied, and may also be different
when changes are made in the analysis itself. To investigate the robustness
of the reported results, this section provides a number of checks by apply-
ing the analysis to various subsamples and by applying some changes to the
approach itself. Only the abnormal returns analysis is repeated here, since the
results for the volumes analysis are less reliable when smaller samples are
selected.
6.1 Distinguishing good and bad news
The method of determining whether an announcement contains good or bad
news is subject to a number of assumptions. Wong (2002) makes a distinction
between bad and good news announcements based on the sign of the abnor-
mal return on the announcement day. As noted previously, this may be wrong
and therefore the distinction in the analyses of this paper has been based on
the CAR of the period t =−5 to t = 4. To compare the previously reported
results to Wong’s (2002) approach, the results of the analysis using the sign
of the day zero abnormal return to define bad vs. good news are reported in
Figure 6 and Table 9.
Looking at the plots in Figure 6, the conclusions for the total sample con-
cerning a cleaner market do not seem to be affected by the way bad news is
distinguished from good news: there are no apparent differences between the
two regimes. This is confirmed when looking at Table 9. The 30-day run-up
for the total sample is insignificant, both for bad news announcements and
good news announcements. The differences are also insignificant. The abso-
lute day zero AARs are positive and highly significant, with no differences
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Figure 6 – Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns: bad/good news distinction by sign of
announcement day abnormal return
before and after MAD. This would indicate that the Amsterdam stock market
is clean, with no suspicion of information leakage or illegal insider trading.
This conclusion changes when the data is separately analysed for the dif-
ferent capitalization sizes. The results for large caps are in line with those
obtained from the original analysis, leading to inconclusive results for large
caps. For mid caps the results suggest that the absolute 30-day pre-announce-
ment CAAR for bad news announcements are larger after MAD. The mid
caps analysis with the initial approach provides slight support in favour of a
cleaner market. The results for small caps seem to be in line with those from
Table 1, where the difference in the 30-day run-up for bad news announce-
ments was also significant. However, the significant difference results here
from a puzzling positive run-up after MAD.
A positive run-up for a bad news announcement is possible if the mar-
ket anticipation of the content of the announcement is not in line with the
actual information in the announcement. For instance, if the market antic-
ipates a positive earnings announcement, whereas it actually turns out that
earnings have been lower than expected, the run-up can be positive, with a
negative day zero abnormal return. This may be the case on the level of an
individual announcement, but due to averaging out this observation will not





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION 271
occur after all announcements have been aggregated. There are two possible
explanations for this result to remain visible at the aggregate level. The first is
that the market’s anticipation of results is repeatedly incorrect. However, this
explanation assumes that investors do not alter their expectations. If the mar-
ket as a whole is constantly surprised by the contents of an announcement, it
will alter the ways in which expectations are formed.
The second explanation for why this observation may occur at the aggre-
gate level is that information leakage and illegal insider trading trouble the
market. If an announcement contains good news, but insiders have traded on
that information prior to its official release – thus leading to a positive and
significant pre-announcement run-up – a negative announcement date abnor-
mal return may appear if these insiders (and other investors mimicking their
trades) sell their stocks to cash in the profits obtained. In this case, good news
will be classified as bad news when using the day zero abnormal return to
make the distinction.
By basing the distinction between bad and good news on the sign of the
CAR of the 10-day period from t =−5 to t =4 (with the announcement day
being t =0) this problem of miss-specifying good news as bad news is dimin-
ished, although it still remains if the information in the announcement is fully
reflected in the stock prices as early as six days prior to the official announce-
ment. A second issue is the possibility that the press release obtained from the
database is not the first announcement containing the information. It could
be that the announcement was published sooner in other media. But again,
by using the 10-day period to make the bad/good news distinction, the prob-
lems this issue may cause are diminished. Furthermore, these two problems
can lead to reversed results on the announcement level, yet since the analy-
ses in this paper involve averages over large numbers of announcements, the
results are not likely to be strongly affected.
6.2 Clustering
In the case an announcement is preceded by a prior announcement by the
same firm within the run-up period, the price reaction of this prior announce-
ment will show up in the CAR of the later announcement. This gives rise
to an unjustified suspicion of information leakage and illegal insider trading
prior to the official release of the announcement. To look into this issue the
announcements that are accompanied by another announcement by the same
firm in the period from t =−5 up to and including t = 4 are excluded from
the analysis.
Since this reduced sample still includes announcements that are preceded
by announcements prior to 5 days before its announcement, only the 5-day
run-up is considered. Considering only announcements containing no other
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announcements in the complete period from t = −30 to t = 4 will leave too
small a sample to be able to draw reliable conclusions from the results.
Table 10 shows the results for the reduced sample of unclustered announce-
ments. The results for bad news announcements are in line with those obtained
from the total sample, including the clustered announcements. The results
for good news announcements show that the market is cleaner after MAD,
whereas this was rejected when applying the analysis to the samples includ-
ing the clustered announcements. Furthermore, there is also support for the
idea that news announcements have become more newsworthy after the shift
in supervision on 1 October 2005, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2.
6.3 Two-factor market model
The approach used in the previous section regresses the returns of the indi-
vidual security on the returns of the relevant capitalization index. So for an
announcement by a small cap firm the returns of the firm are regressed on
the returns of the AScX. To increase the explanatory power, it may be use-
ful to add additional explanatory variables. This section discusses changes in
the results when adding the returns of the relevant industry as an explanatory
variable to the market model. The return for any security i at time t is now
given by
Ri,t =αi +βi RC,t +γi RI,t + εi,t , (14)
where Ri,t is the return on security i at time t, RC,t is the return on the rel-
evant capitalization index C at time t , and RI,t is the return on the relevant
industry index I at time t . For each announcement this equation is then esti-
mated with an estimation window of 120 days and the abnormal returns are
defined as
AR j,t = R j,t − (αˆ j + βˆ j RC,t + γˆ j RI,t ), (15)
where AR j,t is the abnormal return on announcement j at time t , where the
returns are those of the security releasing announcement j . Thus, αˆ j , βˆ j and
γˆ j are the estimates of the market model parameters for announcement j .
Time t is here relative to the date of the news announcement, with t =0 being
the announcement day.
An estimation of the model in Eq. (14) will suffer from multicollinear-
ity, since the return of a security is regressed both on the return of the cap
index and the return of the industry index. These two indices are obviously
not unrelated. The industry indices are obtained from NYSE Euronext and
are based on the ICB classification. They are subsamples of the Amsterdam
AllShares Index (AAX), as are the cap indices. The correlation between the
cap and industry indices affects the interpretation of the coefficients of the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MARKET ABUSE REGULATION 275
explanatory variables, but as long as the relationship between the indices is
stable over time, the forecast is still reliable.
The change in the results will be most pronounced for the results of the
analysis by industry (Table 7), so Table 11 reports the results of the analy-
sis using the two-factor market model by industry. The conclusions from the
results for Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Financials
are the same as those from the one factor market model used in Section 5.
The results for the Technology industry provide more support for the sus-
picions formulated earlier. Using the original one factor market model the
results for Technology are consistent with a cleaner market, whereas it is sus-
pected that the significant difference is caused by the fact that a large por-
tion of the announcements within the technology sample are issued by small
capitalization firms. Adding the industry index return to the market model
improves the fit of the model.
To conclude this section, the results hold up to the robustness checks.
First, basing the distinction on the abnormal return of the announcement
day does not change the conclusions about the changes due to the shift in
supervision. However, using the day zero AR instead of the CAR of a period
surrounding the announcement, good news announcements may be wrongly
classified as bad news announcements.
Second, adjusting for the issue of clustering also influences the results, in
the sense that the market is cleaner and press releases contain the same infor-
mation before and after MAD.
Finally, adding the industry index return to the market model as an extra
explanatory variable improves the fit of the model, yet the problem with add-
ing the industry index return to the model is that if a certain industry index
is heavily influenced by a small number of firms, price reactions surrounding
announcements by these firms will turn up in the industry index, which will
cause these announcements not to be associated with high abnormal returns,
although the price reactions are caused by them.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has evaluated the effects of the transfer of supervision of the pub-
lication of price-sensitive information by companies listed on the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange. The first hypothesis is that MAD has decreased the cumula-
tive average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal volume prior
to the public release of news announcements. The results are inconclusive for
large and medium sized firms, whereas the hypothesis cannot be rejected for
small firms. This is in line with what is found for the effects of the US Regu-
lation Fair Disclosure, where the effects are most pronounced for small firms
(see Collver (2007), for a discussion). Presenting the results for different types
of corporate news announcements, the results show that the market is cleaner














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































278 TYAS PREVOO AND BAS TER WEEL
for Alliances/M&A announcements. For announcements of this type, contain-
ing good news, the suspicious pre-announcement run-up observed before 1
October 2005 is not longer present afterwards.
An important note to these results presented is the dependence of cer-
tain characteristics of the corporate news announcements to the supervisor.
The type of announcement is not independent of the supervisor, nor is the
cap size of the firm publishing the announcement. Therefore the analysis is
applied to cap sizes separately and to announcement types separately. The
results are only significant for small cap firms and for announcements of the
type Alliances/M&A, indicating that the new regulation improves the cleanli-
ness of the market for these samples. However, an untabulated test of inde-
pendence between these two characteristics shows that the null hypothesis
of independence is rejected after MAD at the 1% level, and before MAD
at the 10% level. Looking at numbers of announcements, 21% of small cap
announcements (76 out of 361) in the period after MAD are of the type Alli-
ances/M&A, whereas this share is only 10% (25/257) prior to the new regu-
lation. Further research has to determine whether the results depend on cap
size or on announcement type, with the results here being a strong first-stage
signal.
With the observation that the number of announcements increased after 1
October 2005 the question arose if the information content of these announce-
ments was still as high as before. The results from the analyses presented in
this paper lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 2, that there is less information
per press announcement, meaning that the information level of announce-
ments after MAD has not decreased. Although the difference in the absolute
AARs before and after MAD is found not to be significant, in most cases the
absolute AARs are actually larger afterwards, indicating that announcements
are more informative since MAD.
Hallock and Mashayekhi (2003) investigate whether news announcements
have become less newsworthy over the period 1970–2000. He actually finds
that for earnings announcements the share price reaction around the
announcement date has increased over the years. If this trend also applies
to the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, it becomes less straightforward to inter-
pret the results in this paper. The increase observed in the announcement day
absolute abnormal return after the shift in supervision might then not be a
result of the change in regime, but rather the result of a positive time-trend
in the share price reaction to news announcements. Further research has to
determine whether or not this upward trend is large enough to nullify or even
reverse the results obtained in this paper. The returns then have to be cor-
rected for this upward trend and the information content of releases needs to
be re-evaluated.
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The conclusions regarding the information content of releases might be
biased for another reason. If the increase in the number of announcements
after the implementation of MAD really is only temporary, the period over
which to apply the analysis should not include this period of adaptation
to the new regulation. Given that news announcements do not contain less
information using the period analysed in this paper, removing the adaptation
period, which is associated with more and possibly less informative announce-
ments, will only strengthen the confidence with which the hypothesis is
rejected. The results using a post-adaptation period are even likely to be con-
sistent with a hypothesis that news announcements are more informative after
MAD.
Even though the amount of suspicious trading is lower after MAD, the
30-day run-up CAARs are significant in most cases, even after the change in
regulation. This significant run-up is an indicator for the presence of infor-
mation leakage and illegal insider trading, but it does not allow for a strong
conclusion regarding the extent of the problem. Elliott et al. (1984) inves-
tigate the issue of insider trading from a different perspective. With trad-
ing behaviour by corporate insiders being found to be profitable, they test
whether this profitable trading by insiders in general is related to the public
release of information. They show that most insider trading does not seem
related to news announcements. Meulbroek (1992) shows that less than half
of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed before takeovers occurs
on insider trading days. This means that although half of the run-up seems
to be caused by corporate insiders, investors who are not obliged to register
their trades cause the other half. Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) find that the
target firm stock price run-up found by other researchers begins prior to the
public news announcement, which gives rise to the suspicion of use of non-
public information and hence of illegal insider trading. However, they also
find that this run-up only starts after an unpublicised initiation of the trans-
action.
A final issue worth noting and worth further investigation is that of
clustering, which was briefly discussed in Section 6. If an announcement is
preceded by another announcement, the price reaction to this first announce-
ment will show up in the pre-announcement run-up periods for the firm at
hand. This problem probably extends beyond the firm level. A firm’s stock
price can also be influenced by announcements made by other firms. Within
the financial industry, for example, an announcement by Bank1 might have
an effect on the stock price of Bank2. If this announcement is followed by
an announcement by Bank2, Bank2 will show significant pre-announcement
abnormal returns. In terms of the analysis applied here, this would lead to a
suspicion of illegal insider trading, whereas the run-up was actually caused by
the announcement by Bank1. This problem has partially been taken care of
by adding the industry index as a factor in the market model (Section 6.3).
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Further research is necessary to investigate the extent to which this affects the
results from this analysis.
Also, clustering of announcements could lead to an under- or overesti-
mation of the pre-announcement run-up and thus influence the conclusions
regarding the prevalence of illegal insider trading on the Amsterdam stock
market. If insiders trade on information to be released in future news
announcements, the detection of this illegal insider trading will depend on
other announcements by the same firm within the 30-day pre-announcement
period. If it concerns a good news announcement, run-up CAR will be posi-
tive in the case of illegal insider trading, and if in the run-up period another
good news announcement occurs, the run-up CAR will be even larger, increas-
ing the significance of the run-up. However, if a bad news announcement
occurs in that same run-up period, the positive run-up caused by the ille-
gal insider trading will be diminished by the market reaction to the bad
news announcement, thereby decreasing the detection of illegal insider trad-
ing. If the shares of good news and bad news announcements present in the
30-day run-up period are equal and if the issue of clustering is comparable
in both periods, the effect of increased and decreased probability of detection
will average out when taking the average CARs over the total samples. How-
ever, if these conditions do not hold, the results presented here are biased due
to the bias present in the clustering of announcements.
APPENDIX I
Table 12 gives the number of announcements that have been released by an
individual security within different capitalization sizes and within different
time periods. For example, the first security in the list (Aalberts) published
11 announcements in the 15 months prior to MAD coming into effect. At
the time of publication of these 11 announcements, Aalberts was classified as
a mid cap. It also released 11 announcements in the 15 months following 1
October 2005. At the time of their release, for 2 of these 11 Aalberts was clas-
sified as a mid cap, whereas for the other 9, it was classified as a large cap.
Depending on the composition of the total number of announcements
released by a single security, its daily volume is included in either one of
the three market volume indices or in none at all. If the share of its total
announcements published within a single cap size group is larger than 95%,
the daily volume of that listing is used in the construction of the market vol-
ume index for that cap size. Table 13 tabulates which industries are used in
the construction of the three market volume indices.
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APPENDIX II
Table 14 provides an overview of the different types of announcements and
their appearance before and after the introduction of MAD.
TABLE 14 – DIVISION OF ANNOUNCEMENTS IN EURONEXT CORPORATE NEWS
DATABASE IN 9 ANNOUNCEMENT TYPES























Takeover bids 0 4 4
Alliances/M&A total 227 574 801
Sales Sales 68 99 167
Sales other subject 29 0 29

















New contracts 0 1 1
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TABLE 14 – continued




























Income total 740 777 1,517
Corporate life Corporate life 0 1 1












Corporate life total 21 161 182
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TABLE 14 – continued















Meetings/events total 21 26 47
Other (blank) 1 2 3
Change in capital 0 1 1




Other subject 738 554 1,292
Other subject change in
capital
0 1 1







Trends, analyses 0 1 1
Other total 739 569 1,308
Total 2,104 2,875 4,979
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